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Abstract  
Governments that lack the capacity to mine resources themselves have to attract foreign 
direct investment. However, since resources are not renewable, countries need to capture a 
‘fair’ share of mineral resource rent to promote their development. While the third raw 
materials super cycle increased the global turnover of the mining sector by a factor of 4.6 
between 2002 and 2010, the tax revenues from the non-renewable natural resource sector 
earned by African governments only grew by a factor of 1.15. The sharing of mineral resource 
rent between governments and investors is often criticised for being unfavourable to African 
governments. But what do we really know about the mineral resource rent sharing in Africa? 
The aim of this study is to review theoretical and empirical studies on rent sharing in Africa 
and note their limits for the knowledge of the actual mineral rent sharing. 
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1. Introduction 
Over half of African countries produce mineral resources, and 20 of the continent's 54 countries 
are considered to be natural resource-rich according to IMF criteria
1
. Although it harbours 
around 30% of all minerals on the planet, Africa is still the continent where the least use is made 
of mineral resources. Expenditure on exploration has risen significantly over the past decade, 
however. A record was set in 2012, when African accounted for 17% of the global exploration 
budget (for all minerals combined), estimated at 23.42 billion USD
2
. It overtook Canada and 
took second place behind Latin America. While the Democratic Republic of the Congo is the 
country where exploration expenditure is highest, West Africa has become a priority region for 
expenditure on searching for gold deposits. The mining sector thus presents a number of issues 
for the development of countries. 
In most cases, natural resources are public property, and the relationships between investors and 
governments are complex. Governments that lack the capacity to mine resources themselves 
have to attract foreign direct investment
3
, but since resources are not renewable, countries need 
to capture a „fair‟ share of mineral resource rent to aid their development. From the point of view 
of mining companies, the role of governments is to maintain a stable system that is favourable to 
business. The characteristics of the sector ‒ namely irreversibility of investment and uncertainty 
as to whether a project will be profitable (extraction costs, sale price of the mineral extracted, 
etc.) ‒ make the extraction of natural resources particularly sensitive to economic policy 
decisions. Decisions on taxation can have consequences that are crucial to the sector's 
development. 
So far, mining taxation systems have adapted to changes in the prices of raw materials. In the 
1980s-1990s, commodity prices were low and governments granted companies a large number of 
tax and non-tax concession for various period of time. The mining sector has been liberalised 
(Campbell, 2004) and African countries are developing their tax systems to attract foreign 
investors (Otto, 1998; Land, 2007). Exceptions to general law are becoming a key component of 
tax framework to reduce the multinationals tax burden and hence to make deposit more 
profitable. While the third raw materials super cycle increased the global turnover of the mining 
sector by a factor of 4.6 between 2002 and 2010, the tax revenues from the non-renewable 
natural resource sector earned by governments only grew by a factor of 1.15
4
. The increase in 
global prices is overturning the balance of power between investors and governments. In total, 
110 nations amended their mining codes recently or are planning to do so (Otto et al., 2006 and 
Appendix 1). The current political context of the sector is strained; governments do not want to 
                                                 
 
 
1
 IMF (2012), Sub-Saharan Africa: Sustaining Growth Amid Global Uncertainty, World Economic and Financial 
Survey, Washington DC. 
2
 SNL Metals Economics Group: Worldwide Exploration Trends 2013. 
3
 All of the big multinationals in the sector have a presence in Africa: Glencore Xstrata (iron in Mauritania, zinc in 
Burkina Faso, copper and cobalt in DR Congo, nickel in Tanzania, copper, cobalt and zinc in Zambia, zinc in 
Namibia, chromium in South Africa, etc.), Rio Tinto (aluminium in Cameroon and Ghana, bauxite in Guinea, 
ilmenite in Mozambique, copper and ilmenite in South Africa), Anglo American (diamonds in Botswana, Namibia 
and South Africa, platinum in Zimbabwe, iron and manganese in South Africa), Barrick (copper in Zambia), 
Newmont (gold in Ghana), AngloGold Ashanti (gold in Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Namibia, DR Congo and South 
Africa) and Kinross (gold in Ghana and Mauritania). 
4
 FERDI tax revenue database (http://www.ferdi.fr/fr/indicateur/base-de-donn%C3%A9es-sur-les-recettes-fiscales-
en-afrique-sub-saharienne-1980-2010). 
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repeat the mistakes made in previous decades, and companies fear „hold-ups‟ or expropriations 
like what occurred in Latin America (Daniel et al., 2010; Duncan, 2006). 
This political background stresses the issues of mining taxation. The development of taxation 
systems and tax competition between countries (Land, 2007) are highlighting the lack of a 
theoretical and/or empirical consensus on the issue of how resource mineral rent should be 
shared. It now appears to be vital to build a win-win relationship, and hence to find ways of 
achieving a „fair‟ sharing of revenue between governments and investors (Black and Roberts, 
2006; Daniel, 2010). The aim of this study is to review theoretical and empirical studies on rent 
sharing in developing countries. Re-examining the definition of resource rent and the concept of 
„fair‟ sharing between investors and government helps to understand the debates. Reviewing the 
empirical studies carried out on the subject will then make it possible to identify the existing 
tools used to analyse resource rent sharing and their weaknesses. 
2. Theoretical approaches: definition of rent and optimal taxation 
The main criticism of taxation is to cause economic distortions which induce an efficiency and 
wellbeing lost for society (Sandmo, 1989). In theory, taxing up to 100% of rent would not 
change investment and extraction decisions. A rent tax seems to be close to a neutral tax. In 
practice, however, there are many obstacles to apply a “neutral tax instrument” to the sector: 
geological uncertainties, constraints on production capacity at the global level, etc… 
Governments, therefore, try to create a tax system to capture a proportion of rent that is deemed 
to be „fair‟ whilst encouraging private investors to explore, develop and exploit minerals. This 
first section examines the definition of rent and the theoretical foundations that support neutrality 
in its taxation, and then the tax instruments and other charges and fees burden by the sector. 
2.1. Taxation of rent and economic efficiency 
The definition of rent that is most widely used today is: „the excess of revenues over all costs of 
production, including those of discovery and development, as well as the normal return to 
capital‟ (IMF, 2012). Although the definition appears to be straightforward, rent is still difficult 
to understand. 
Ricardo (1817) defines rent in terms of difference of agricultural land fertility. He observes that 
for the same level of output, the least fertile land requires the greatest amount of labour or capital 
and that if the price does not cover costs, production occurs at a loss and output is not brought to 
the market. It is therefore the most productive, i.e. most fertile, land that will yield a larger profit. 
The rent is a long-term rent which therefore depends on differences in fertility between land and 
corresponds to the difference between the marginal cost of production and the price. Rent does 
not play a role in setting the sale price of the resource; rather, it is a result of this price-setting. 
According to Garnaut and Clunies Ross (1975, 1983), this ‘differential rent’ or ‘pure rent’ is the 
defining characteristic of mining industries, i.e. the fact that production conditions, which 
depend on the characteristics of the exploitation of the resource (location, difficulties in terms of 
exploitation, quality of the resource, etc.), cannot be identically reproduced. This means that 
taxing up to 100% of the differential rent generated by the sector should not alter the allocation 
of resources within the economy, which corresponds to the  
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From the second half of the nineteenth century onwards, the concept of rent expanded to 
encompass all advantageous situations which make it possible to increase the revenue of an 
economic operator (Khan, 2000
5
; Otto and Cordes, 2002; Otto et al. 2006). Economic rent 
generally stems from private property and limited supply
6
: contracts, patents, barriers to entry 
into certain markets, and so on. The task of valuing rent is complicated, as long-term rent can 
differ from short-term rent. 
In the short term, production continues for as long as the sale price covers variable costs such as 
labour and energy (McDonald and Siegel, 1985). If the market price is below the average total 
cost of production but equal to or greater than the average variable cost, the activity yields a 
short-term „rent‟, also known as „quasi-rents’. This quasi-rent corresponds to the difference 
between the revenue generated by the activity and the variable production costs, i.e. the cost of 
fixed factors valued at the market price (Otto et al., 2006). Quasi-rent can, however, be greater 
than fixed costs alone when the revenues generated by the activity cover all variable costs and 
some of the fixed costs. 
Mining activity comprises three stages: exploration, development and extraction (Garnaut and 
Clunies Ross, 1983). During the first two stages (exploration and development), investments are 
large and constitute fixed costs which cannot be reversed by the investor. At the end of first 
stage, quasi-rent corresponds to expected revenue less exploration and development costs of the 
deposit. At the end of the second stage, quasi-rent corresponds to expected revenue less 
extraction cost. Total rent, which takes into account all costs associated with the various stages 
of the project and all revenues generated by the project, can be less than the sum of quasi-rents. 
Therefore, seeking to achieve neutrality of taxation entails seeking to tax, not quasi-rents, but 
rent valued over the entire lifetime of the project (Boadway and Keen, 2010). 
In a dynamic view of rent, Hotelling (1931) introduces the issue of inter-temporal management 
of non-renewable natural resources. How should one allocate a given quantity of resources 
between different periods of time so as to maximise the utility derived from the extraction and 
consumption of the resource? He then defines scarcity rent. The extraction of a resource 
generates a cost of use which corresponds to the opportunity cost of reducing stock for future use 
(Tilton, 2004). The producer then seeks to maximise the net present value of the project, i.e. 
revenue less the various costs over time. The investor increases his output until the sale price 
covers the marginal cost of production and the opportunity cost. Valuing this opportunity cost is 
therefore of crucial importance, as this determines the taxable rent and alters investment and 
extraction decisions. 
Whilst the aim of the tax system is to capture rent throughout the lifetime of the project, leaving 
the required minimum return on investment for the investor, inaccurate valuation of the 
economic rent, and hence the net present value of the project, it inevitably causes economic 
distortions: over-exploitation or, conversely, under-exploitation of the resource (Guj, 2012). The 
valuation of rent is subject to a certain number of constraints: knowledge of prices, costs, and the 
discount rate. This information is difficult to obtain or predict, but absolutely necessary in order 
to apply an optimal and economically neutral tax. 
 
                                                 
 
 
5
 The author distinguishes between at least six different types of rents. 
6
 If the factor of production is public property which is available in an unlimited quantity and accessible to everyone, 
there is no rent (this applies to the environment, for example). 
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2.2. Taxation of rent and increase in the number of objectives in developing 
countries 
Taxation of the mining sector is essentially a delicate balancing act between the desire to attract 
the international investors necessary to tap into mineral resource rent and „sufficient‟ capturing 
of this rent by and for the government (Laporte and Rota-Graziosi, 2015). This balancing act is 
made particularly delicate by the characteristics of the mining sector (non-renewable resources, 
irreversible investments, high uncertainty) and international competition to attract foreign 
technical expertise, which is limited but essential to extract the resource. In practice, the 
competition between countries means that governments capture about 50% of rent (Land, 2008) 
and that investment depends not only on the current resource rent sharing system, but also on the 
anticipated resource rent sharing system (Boadway and Keen, 2010). 
Anticipation of taxation during the various stages of a project is crucial for investors. If an 
investor thinks that the tax system will be unfavourable to him during the production period, 
there is a risk that he will not make his investment („hold-up risk‟7). However, if the tax system 
is changed after investments are made, the investor no longer has any choice. As long as it 
covers variable costs, production is economically preferable to stopping production. So as the 
capital invested by a company increases, the balance of power shifts from the investor to the 
government (Vernon, 1971). Governments therefore offer significant advantages during the 
exploration and development phases, but can decide to take these advantages away during the 
extraction phase. The temptation to reduce the advantages given to a company is all the greater 
where the investment proves to be profitable, which is especially true during periods of high 
international prices (e.g. Zambia, Venezuela and Ecuador in 2008). This risk of time 
inconsistency in tax policy is due the government‟s fundamental difficulty in identifying the 
optimal tax system in an uncertain environment. 
Therefore, aside from the neutrality of taxation, other political, practical and administrative 
considerations inform the choice of instruments used to tax the mining sector (Daniel et al., 
2010; Otto et al., 2006; Lund, 2009; Baunsgaard, 2001; Land, 2008). Whether to make tax 
revenue secure, reduce the risks borne by the government or the investor or facilitate tax 
administration, a large number of instruments are implemented in countries and help to 
determine the share of mineral resource rent that goes to the government (Appendix 2). Certain 
taxes are specific to mining activity, and others are common to all formal companies within the 
economy even though their tax base or rate may differ from those under the common law system 
(Charlet et al., 2013). Non-tax instruments supplement taxation in the capturing of mineral 
resource rent: royalties, production sharing, acquisition by the government of free equity, 
contributions to expenditure on local infrastructure, and so on. In the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, the government owns 5% of the capital of all mining companies that operate in the 
country and has proposed increasing its stake to 35%; in Burkina Faso, this stake is 10%, and in 
Mongolia, the government has acquired 34% of the capital in the OyuTolgoi project. This 
situation means that the government is both a regulator of the sector and a shareholder of mining 
                                                 
 
 
7
 Opportunistic behaviour on the part of governments which can be tempted to increase the tax burden once 
investments have been made. 
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companies at the same time (Allaire et al., 2013). Every resource rent sharing instrument has a 
greater or lesser impact on the exploitation of the resource. 
According to the classification of Otto et al. (2006), in rem taxes (or „production-based taxes‟) 
directly increase production costs (unit-based royalties, ad valorem or specific royalties, sales 
taxes, which affect the variable costs of the project; import and export duties, value added tax, 
withholdings tax on loan interest and services, registration fees and property taxes, which affect 
fixed costs) and thereby generate economic distortions which change investment and production 
decisions (Guj, 2012). In personam taxes (or „profit-based taxes‟) are based on net revenue 
(taxes on profits, additional profits taxes, withholding taxes on remitted dividends,  royalty based 
on some measure of profit, amongst others) and are therefore closer to a tax on rent. But the use 
of in personam taxes alone only allows for inadequate sharing of rent due to the sensitivity of 
their base to transfer prices and the more or less aggressive tax optimisation strategies of private 
investors (Radon, 2007). To the criterion of neutrality, Baunsgaard (2001) adds the criteria of 
risk-sharing and ease of tax administration. In rem taxes limit the risk for the government by 
making revenues secure from the beginning of the project and are simple to administer. 
Identifying the tax system which allows a „fair‟ share of rent seems to depend on degree of the 
risk aversion of the government and private investors and on the government's administrative 
capacity to collect the tax. Considering this, the optimal share of rent would therefore vary from 
one government to the next (and even to one ministry to the next: ministry of finance versus 
ministry of mines, petroleum and hydrocarbons). Given that a system needs to be stable in order 
to attract companies, a tax system that makes it possible to reconcile the expectations of all 
stakeholders is critical during negotiations. 
The increase in the number of resource rent sharing goals has accelerated since the 1990s. 
Expectations with regard to mining sector taxation go beyond mere revenue-raising and extend 
to the environment (Sinkala, 2009; Collier and Venables, 2014), the impact of the sector on the 
local labour market (Public Expenditure Plan, 2014) or economic development in its broadest 
sense (Bird, 2014). Inter-temporal management of public funds levied from the mining sector 
also features prominently in the literature (Baunsgaard, 2012; Traoré, 2014). The aim is no 
longer to tax rent as much as possible in order to maximise public funds without altering the 
production chain, but to maximise social wellbeing. The tax system framework is thus moving 
away from the pursuit of economic neutrality and demonstrates the importance that is attached to 
each objective by mining governments. Every system has consequences for project life and 
hence the sharing of rent between governments and investors (Cawood, 1999; Cordes, 1995; 
Otto et al., 2006). The increase in the number of mining taxation objectives is giving rise to a 
complex web of taxes, making it difficult to assess the sharing of rent and its economic impacts. 
3. Empirical approaches: resource rent sharing and available sources of information 
The sharing of mineral resource rent between governments and investors is often criticised for 
being unfavourable to African governments. However, few studies put figures on this 
phenomenon. After a description of the two dominant methods of valuing rent, the main 
indicators used to assess tax systems are presented. Shafiee et al. (2009) propose a literature 
review of empirical studies that use these two methods, but do not address resource rent sharing. 
Smith (2013) proposes a review of literature focusing on the sharing of mineral resource rent and 
highlights the importance of modelling choices on the result. 
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3.1. Calculating rent: the discounted cash flow method and the modern asset pricing 
model 
The net present value (NPV) that should be generated during the lifetime of a project depends on 
annual mineral output, exploration and development costs, capital costs and extraction costs, the 
lifetime of the project, the sale price, and the discount rate that is associated with the project and 
incorporates the risk (Guj and Garzon, 2007). Two main methods are used to determine NPV: 
the discounted cash flow (DCF) method and the modern asset pricing (MAP) model. 
Discounted cash flow (DCF) method. If a project is „certain‟ and without risks, the discount rate 
is the opportunity cost of the capital. If cash flow is uncertain and risky, the discount rate is made 
up of the opportunity cost of the capital and the premium that compensates the risk assumed by 
the investor. This risk may be project-specific and/or country-specific. Most models incorporate 
a single cash flow but allow for sensitivity analyses that consider different cost or price profiles. 
Monte Carlo simulations are often performed in order to determine a probability distribution for 
each uncertain project variable and thereby obtain different cash flows (Bohren and Schilbred, 
1994). Even at the lowest anticipated price, a mining project should be able to break even 
(Crowson, 1998). The following are needed to create a DCF model: (i) forecasts for the price of 
the mineral over the entire duration of the project, (ii) a valuation of costs making it possible to 
calculate the revenue from the project, and (iii) the discount rate of the project after tax. 
Several authors underline the limitations of this method (Bradley, 1998; Daniel et al., 2010; 
Mackie-Mason, 1990; Samis et al. 2007; Smith, 2013; Salahor, 1998). On the one hand, it 
requires perfect knowledge of the economic indicators that are involved in calculating NPV, and 
on the other hand, it entails knowing the risk associated with each stage of the project. If this is 
not the case, the modeller most often assumes uniform risk, which is not necessarily realistic for 
long-term projects whose risk decreases over time. Finally, these models are arithmetical and 
non-behavioural, which limits the scope of the results and assumes that taxation is neutral in 
respect of production and investment decisions (Smith, 2013). Finally, the model does not take 
account of managerial risk, i.e. the possibility that the mine may be abandoned before the end of 
its life cycle, or that work may be suspended temporarily (Smith and McCardle, 1998). 
Modern asset pricing (MAP) model. In order to take different risk profiles into account, an 
alternative to the DCF model is to calculate the certainty equivalent. Brennan and Schwartz 
(1985) were the first to use this method to value natural resource exploitation projects (Grinblatt 
and Titman, 2002; Laughton, 1998). This method involves determining the cash flow that the 
investor is willing to receive without risk and comparing it with expected future cash flows. The 
investor does not mind whether he receives this certainty equivalent or the uncertain future cash 
flow. The net present value of the project is then defined as the sum total of certainty equivalent 
flows discounted at the risk-free rate. The modern asset pricing (MAP)
8
 model is an elementary 
form of the „real option value‟9 model which takes into account, within a stochastic forecasting 
model, the price dynamics of the mineral and incorporates the interaction between the 
uncertainty as to price and the risk in terms of the project's value. Several price change models 
exist, according to the type of mineral that is studied (Salahor, 1998; Baker et al., 1998). In 1996, 
                                                 
 
 
8
 Modern asset pricing (MAP) model. 
9
 By comparison with the real option value model, only managerial flexibility, i.e. the possibility that the mine will 
be abandoned before it reaches the end of its life cycle or that activity will temporarily be suspended, is not taken 
into account (Podda Abouna, 2014). 
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Laughton used the MAP method to assess the financial structure of a mining project. According 
to Moel and Tufano (2002), companies are increasingly using the MAP method to make their 
own forecasts. To create this type of model, it is necessary to:
10
 (i) choose the stochastic price 
change forecasting model, (ii) determine the price risk due to uncertainty regarding the price of 
the mineral over the period and its discount rate,
11
 and (iii) build the cash flow model for the 
project whilst taking account of the prices predicted by the forecasting model and information 
concerning the costs of the project. The main difficulty of the MAP method lies in identifying 
the right risk profile. Most of the time, only the price is regarded as uncertain and the costs of the 
project are considered to be known. It is therefore necessary to obtain information concerning 
forecasts for the prices of commodities on the financial market.
12
 Bradley (1998) shows that 
valuing net revenues using the DCF method or the MAP method gives different results and 
generates revenue flows with different profiles. 
These two methods have advantages and disadvantages. However, in both cases, having access 
to economic information concerning the project and testing different risk profiles are the two 
crucial points in calculating rent. Only after evaluating the NPV for each project developed in 
the country is it possible to measure the sharing of rent between governments and investors. It 
also measures its effects on investment decisions by way of a certain number of indicators. 
3.2. Rent sharing indicators 
Several indicators are used in the literature to assess tax systems in the mining sector (Daniel and 
Goldworthy, 2010; Otto et al., 2006; Keen and Boadway, 2009; IMF, 2012). Only the ones that 
are most widely used in empirical studies are presented here (see Table 1). The investor is 
interested in profitability indicators, whereas the government seeks to measure its share of rent. 
The indicators chosen by companies measure the profitability of their investment over the entire 
duration of a project. The investor's share of the rent corresponds to the discounted value of net 
cash flows after tax. The profitability of the investment is valued by the internal rate of return on 
the investment (IRR), which corresponds to the discounted rate for which the sum total of cash 
flows is nil. In principle, investment only occurs if the opportunity cost of the capital is lower 
than the internal rate of return on the project. The marginal effective tax rate (METR), for which 
a proxy can be calculated from the IRR before and after tax, captures the impact of the tax 
system on the decision to invest. For a given level of project profitability required by the 
investor, it measures the additional profitability that the project must yield in order to cover tax 
liabilities. It may be regarded as an indicator of tax system neutrality. According to Brealey and 
Myers (2005), the IRR calculation method does not make it possible to take account of 
variability of the opportunity cost of capital over time and makes it difficult to compare projects 
with each other. Empirical studies often compare, for the same project, the impact of different 
tax systems on the sharing of rent from a single project. 
The indicator that is most commonly used to measure the share of rent captured by the 
government is the average effective tax rate (AETR). AETR is the ratio of the NPV of 
government revenue and the NPV of project pre-tax net cash flows13. All taxes specific to the 
                                                 
 
 
10
 Guj and Garzon (2007), quoted in Podda Abouna (2014). 
11
 The discount rate is the risk-free interest rate, because risk is already taken into account in the stochastic model. 
12
 Depending on the mineral, the London Metal Exchange, KITCO or the New York Mercantile Exchange websites. 
13
 Several calculation methods are used in the literature (Otto et al., 2000; Devereux and Griffith, 2003). 
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sector, such as those under the General Taxation Code and other charges and fees, must be 
considered. The AETR makes possible to assess the distribution of the tax burden between 
companies in order to assess fairness in the treatment of companies (Fullerton, 1984; Johnston, 
2003) and make international comparisons (Daniel et al., 2010; Charlet et al., 2013). The share 
of government revenue in total project benefits, measured by the ratio of tax revenues paid by the 
investor and discounted net cash flows less the initial investment, makes it possible to assess the 
sensitivity of government revenue to variation in prices and/or costs and hence how progressive 
the tax system is14. A progressive tax system can encourage the government to develop the 
sector, but a regressive system can enable the government to guarantee a minimum level of tax 
revenue (Brewer et al., 1989). Calculating the coefficient of variation in the proportion of rent 
received by the government for a given revenue distribution makes it possible to ascertain the 
possible variation in government revenues, i.e. the risk assumed by the government. 
Table 1: Main indicators selected in empirical literature 
Agent Objective Indicator 
Investor 
Neutrality 
Marginal effective tax rate (METR) 
Breakeven price 
Profitability 
Internal rate of return on the project (IRR) 
Payback period 
Identification of risks Coefficient of variation of Net Present Value and IRR 
Government 
Tax revenue 
Average effective tax rate (AETR) 
Expected government revenue  
Identification of risks  
Time profile of government revenue 
Coefficient of variation in expected tax revenue 
 
3.3. Review of empirical studies 
Few empirical studies quantify the sharing of rent between investors and governments in the 
natural resources sector (see Appendix 3). Oil is the sector that has been studied the most (Black 
and Roberts, 2006; Daniel et al., 2008; Tordo, 2007), followed by gold (Brewer et al., 1989; Otto 
et al., 2006; inter alia). In the great majority of cases, studies are carried out on hypothetical 
mining projects and the authors apply different tax systems to the project (Black and Roberts, 
2006; Brewer et al., 1989) or only change the base for one tax in order to determine the impact 
on investment indicators or the capturing of rent by the government. Special attention has been 
paid to different types of royalties (Otto et al., 2006; Daniel et al., 2010). It is rare for 
simulations to analyse the overall framework of a mining tax system for a single country. 
Charges and fees are often dealt with secondarily to tax instruments (Black and Roberts, 2006), 
which makes the calculation of resource rent sharing incomplete. The aforementioned indicators 
are commonly used by the authors to combine the operation of a tax with an objective of 
neutrality of taxation or government revenue. The discounted cash flow method combined with 
ad hoc sensitivity analyses is the commonest method. Few studies take into account the effects 
of interaction between the mining sector and the rest of the economy (Thomas, 2001). Finally, it 
is important to note that there has been very little analysis of the tax systems in developing 
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 This particular indicator still under revision in FAD. 
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countries, more specifically, in African countries. All of these studies are listed in Appendix 4 to 
this document. 
The IMF made efforts to improve the knowledge of states in the rent-sharing area. The FARI 
model is now used in countries receiving IMF technical assistance in the mining and oil sectors. 
However, neither the basic economic data nor the tax information or the results of rent sharing 
studies are publicly available for at least two reasons: (1) technical assistance reports are 
compiled from confidential data; (2) they are property of the local ministry of finance of 
countries receiving technical assistance and may be published only with their agreement. 
Furthermore, some natural resource rich African countries do not have specific technical 
assistance. 
This literature review shows that it is currently very difficult to ascertain the actual sharing of 
rent between African governments and investors in a standardised manner. Economic data on 
projects are either not widely available or difficult for researchers to use, which forces them to 
create hypothetical mine projects. However, as Otto et al. (2006) and all of the sensitivity 
analyses in this literature point out, tax system evaluation indicators are sensitive to the 
characteristics of mines and changes in their economic environments. In addition, no maps are 
available, making regional or international comparisons difficult. In the current context of 
renegotiating mining codes, creating an innovative database that allows standardised assessment 
of the sharing of mineral resource rent in Africa would appear, in the light of the studies 
analysed, to be very important. 
3.4. Problems faced by empirical studies: lack of economic and tax data 
Ascertaining how rent is shared between governments and investors requires the capacity to 
calculate the net present value (NPV) that should be generated for each project. Whichever 
method is used, the following must be known: the annual production of the mineral, the capital 
costs and operating costs for each stage of the project, its lifetime, the sale price and the 
associated discount rate. The fact that few empirical studies have been carried out on mining 
projects clearly illustrates the difficulty of obtaining and processing this information. Economic 
data on industrial mining companies (feasibility studies, financial statements and technical 
reports) are available online for companies listed on stock exchanges in Canada, the USA, 
Australia and the United Kingdom. Data in feasibility studies (forecasts) can be compared with 
information held in activity reports (implementation). It may therefore be difficult, but not 
impossible, to create the economic part of the database.  
To measure the sharing of NPV between investors and the government, it is also necessary to 
know all of the tax instrument and other charges and fees burden by the sector. None of the 
existing economic databases contains all these information on the mining sector. The FERDI 
database presents the tax revenues levied from the sector for 41 countries in sub-Saharan Africa 
over the 1980-2010 period (Mansour, 2014). The countries listed in the database make up over 
95% of the countries that the World Bank publication describes as being natural resource-rich. 
Revenues from oil and gas and those from mining activities are combined, but few countries are 
rich in both hydrocarbons and minerals other than hydrocarbons. Revenues collected from 
activities in the mining, oil and gas sectors are separated from those collected from other 
activities. The „taxes on non-renewable natural resources‟ category combines the tax revenues 
levied from extractive industries (corporation tax, royalties and also profit-sharing, dividends 
received on equity held in state-owned enterprises and dividends and other investment income 
received on holdings acquired directly by the government in extractive industries). The ICTD 
database lists the revenues levied from the natural resources sector and breaks them down by 
type of tax: income taxes, corporation taxes, indirect taxes (mainly export taxes) and non-tax 
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revenues. These two databases propose a sector-based approach which limits the opportunity to 
ascertain the sharing of rent between governments and investors for a mineral, much less analyse 
its determining factors. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) promotes 
accountable management of natural resources by making public, the revenue paid by firms in 
each partner‟s countries. The database is broken down by country and by sector (oil/gas and 
mining). However, the EITI objective in not the rent sharing evaluation and do not allow to reach 
it. 
To measure the sharing of rent, it is necessary to list the tax codes, mining codes, customs codes 
and mining agreements that are in force in Africa. Charlet et al. (2013) list the taxes levied in 
French-speaking African countries (see Appendix 2), which would make it possible to 
recalculate the revenues collected from each project and hence the sharing of rent. 
Based on these tax information and project economic data, the expected rent sharing between 
governments and investors can be calculated for each mining project. It could be possible to 
compare the theoretical tax revenue with the effective tax revenue in the EITI database. The gap 
between expected revenue and achievement can be explained by a change in operating 
conditions (geology, costs and resource prices), failure of tax administration or tax optimization 
practices of mining companies. 
4. Conclusion 
The aim of this study is to review the theoretical and empirical studies concerning the sharing of 
rent in developing countries in order to identify the difficulties encountered in conducting this 
type of exercise, so that tools to mitigate them can subsequently be proposed. 
Having reviewed the theoretical approaches to the valuation of rent on a microeconomic level, 
we find that mineral resource rent is a concept that is difficult to understand and measure; rent 
can change as a project moves from one phase to the next, and risk and the discount rate of the 
resource must be taken into account. The most widely accepted definition of rent relates to the 
calculation of the net present value of a project, i.e. „the excess of revenues over all costs of 
production, including those of discovery and development, as well as the normal return to 
capital‟ (IMF, 2012). However, only if governments have the capacity to value the economic rent 
of a project can the possibility of capturing tax revenue in an economically neutral way be 
guaranteed. 
Due to the difficulties in obtaining all of the information necessary to calculate mineral resource 
rent, governments are increasing the number of tax instrument, charges and fees in order to 
capture a share of resource rent that they deem „fair‟ but which ultimately depends strictly on the 
objectives that they have set for themselves. This is why different indicators are used in the 
literature to assess tax systems in the natural resources sector according to the objectives of 
governments and investors. A review of empirical studies shows that few studies are conducted 
in developing countries and African countries in particular, and that they are based mainly on 
hypothetical projects. Knowledge of the actual distribution of rent between investors and 
governments is scant, and knowledge of its determining factors is even more so.  
The distribution of mineral resource rent in Africa cannot be analysed without access to figures 
and transparent, standardised information. The creation of a rent-sharing database will be to 
conduct in-depth research into the value of the sector's tax potential, the tax optimisation 
practices of multinationals and the knock-on effects that the mining sector has on the rest of the 
economy, which cannot be possible considering the actual knowledge of rent sharing in Africa.  
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Appendix 1: Renegotiation of contracts in Africa (as at 30 September 2013) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Country Company  Mineral Year Status  No. of contracts Contract Effects of renegotiation 
      Renegotiated         23 
  Anvil Mining Kulu Concentrate Kinsevere, AMCK Sprl 
  BOSS MINING Sprl (Mukondo Mining and Savannah Mining) 
  Compagnie Minière de Tondo, CMT Sprl 
  Compagnie Minière du Sud Katanga, CMCK Sprl 
  Congolaise des Mines et de Développement, COMIDE Sprl 
  Compagnie Minière de Luisha, COMILU Sprl 
  Compagnie Minière de Musonoi, COMMUS Sprl 
  DRC Copper and Cobalt Project, DCP Sari 
  Kamoto Copper Company, KCC Sari 
  Kasonta Lupota Mines, KALUMINES Sprl 
  KIMIN Sprl (ex lease Gécamines ‒ SOMIKA Sprl) 
  Kipushi Corporation, KICO Sari 
  Minière de Kasombo, MIKAS Sprl 
  Minière de Kalumbwe Myunga, MKM Sprl 
  Mutanda ya Mukonkota Mining, MUMI Sprl 
  PTM Sprl (CAYMAN) 
  Ruashi Mining Sprl 
  Shituru Mining Corporate, SMCO Sprl 
  Société Minière de Kolwezi, SMK Sprl 
  Société d'Exploitation de Kipoi, SEK Sprl 
  Société Minière de Kabolela et de Kipese, SMKK Sprl 
  Société de Traitement de Terril de Lubumbashi, STL/GTL Sprl 
  SWANMINES Sprl 
      Renegotiated and terminated  3 
  Chabara Mining 
  Congo Zinc and  
  PZCE 
Renegotiated  1   ORAMA PROPERTIES Sprl  
      Renegotiated and terminated 1   SENTINELLES Sprl 
Renegotiated  5 
  Minière du Kasaï, MIKAS Sprl 
  Société Minière de la Lulua, SML Sprl  
  Société Minière de Sankuru, SMDS Sprl 
  Société Kasaïenne de Diamants, SKD Sprl 
  Société Minière de Lubulanji, LUMI Sprl 
Renegotiated and terminated 1   DGI Mining Sprl 
Renegotiated  5 
  Assistance Technique et Financier, ATF 
  Blue Rosé Sprl 
  Borgakim Sprl 
  Gorumbwa Sprl 
  Kibali Gold Sprl 
 Renegotiated and terminated 3 
  AMANI Sprl 
  RAMBI Sprl  
  TANGOLD Sprl 
Renegotiated  3 
  GEMICO Sprl  
  GMB Sprl  
  DFSA Sprl 
Renegotiated and terminated  3 
  CAR Sprl 
  COCO Mining  
  Sprl and SOL Sprl 
Renegotiated  2   MMK Sari  
  Long Fei Sprl  
Renegotiated and terminated 3 
  KGHM Sprl 
  MUYAFA Sprl  
  SOCOMIE Sprl 
Democratic 
Republic of 
the Congo 
Financial effects: 
 - Signature bonuss 
 Based on the principle of calculating with reference to the Chinese model,  
the signature bonus has been set at 35 USD/tCu, or 1% of the  
volume of reserves for the other substances. 
 A total of USD 307,283,040 has been released as follows: 
 - Gécamines: USD 290,613,040 
- Kisenge Manganèse: USD 9,000,000 
- MIBA: mainly prospecting contracts 
- OKIMO: USD 4,500,000 
- SAKIMA: USD 70,000 
- SODIMICO: USD 3,100,000 
 The first tranche of the signature bonus amount expected  
for 2009 is USD 66,220,000. 
 - Area fees 
 Renegotiation has benefited the state treasury by releasing  
evaded area fees of approximately USD 5,206,000,  
mainly for the partnerships with BORGAKIM (OKIMO) to the amount of  
USD 5,100,000 and MMK (SODIMICO) to the amount of USD 106,000. 
 - Royalties 
 Renegotiation has made it possible to incorporate the principle of payment of  
royalties to state-owned enterprises when partnerships commence  
production. 
 
2008 Gold Société aurifère du Kivu et du  
Maniema (SAKIMA) 
2008  Copper 
 Société de Développement  
 Industriel et Minier du Congo  
(Sodimico) 
2008 Diamonds La Société Minière de Bakwanga  
      „MIBA‟ 
OFFICE DES MINES D‟OR DE  
KILO-MOTO (OKIMO /  
SOKIMO) 
Gold 2008 
 Générale des Carrières et des  
Mines (Gécamines) Copper, cobalt, zinc, nickel, uranium 2008 
  Entreprise minière de Kisenge  
Manganèse (EMKM-Mn)  Manganese 2008 
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Source: Charlet, Laporte, Graziosi (2013). 
Rio Tinto  Iron 2011 Renegotiated 1 Simfer SA  Settlement Agreement: government-owned equity, granting of  
presidential decrees, taxation and royalty and infrastructure.  
BSG Resources Iron N/A Intention to renegotiate 
RUSAL Bauxite N/A Intention to renegotiate Friguia  
Liberia   ArcelorMittal  Iron 2005 Renegotiated 1 
The Indian giant set the prices of the mineral itself. After a year  
of discussions, the group is now following market prices;  
the tax exemption that it received has now ended. 
African Minerals Iron 2011 Renegotiated 1 Tonkolili Iron 
London Mining  Iron  2011 Renegotiated 1 Marampa 
Replaces the clause in the London Mining contract concerning 
a ten-year tax break for the company which reduced its  
tax rate from 37.5% to 6%, increasing in stages to  
30%. Sources: „THE REVISED LONDON MINING  
AGREEMENT‟  
http://www.christianaid.org.uk/Images/sierra-leone-mining- 
briefing.pdf 
South Africa‟s AngloGold  
Ashanti  Gold N/A N/A n/a 
Newmont of Greenwood Gold N/A N/A n/a 
AREVA     Uranium   2008 Renegotiated 1 Bakouma 
In July 2007, Areva bought UraMin, a Canadian uranium  
extraction company which at that time owned the Bakouma  
concession. The CAR protested and demanded that Areva  
renegotiate the contract. In August 2008, Areva agreed to pay  
USD 40 million over five years, to develop the country's  
infrastructures and to employ 900 local workers at the peak 
of its activity. At the end of 2009, the CAR demanded nearly  
2 billion CFA francs (USD 4 million) in taxes and royalties  
in relation to the transfer of UraMin.  
Axmin  Gold 2009/2010 Renegotiated 1 Bambari/Ouaka 
Axmin requested an exploration permit in March 2009 but  
only received one in August 2010 after agreeing to pay a  
bonus of USD 11 million and delivering three 4x4 vehicles.  
Guinea  
Central 
African Republic  
 Sierra Leone  
In 2010, Ghana changed the mining royalty rate to a fixed  
rate of 5% from a variable rate of 3-6%.   
AngloGold Ashanti and Newmont of Greenwood have stability  
agreements set at 3%. The government wants to renegotiate the  
stability agreement. 
Ghana  
Intention to renegotiate on  
the part of the government  
     but not accepted by 
          the company  
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Appendix 2: Examples of tax systems in French-speaking Africa  
 
Country 
 
 
Legislation 
 
Mining royalty (% of 
total turnover) 
Government 
stake 
 
Profit tax 
Minimum 
lump-sum 
tax 
Tax on income 
from transferable 
securities 
Burkina 
Faso 
 
 
 
 
 
Law no. 031-2003/AN of 8 May 
2003 
Decree no. 2005-048/PRES of 3 
February 2005 
Decree no. 2005-
682/PRES/PM/MCE/MFB of 30 
December 2005 
7% - diamonds and 
precious stones 
4% - base metals 
and other mineral 
substances 
3% - industrial gold 
and precious metals 
3% - artisanally 
mined gold, and tax 
relief of 100 CFA 
francs per gram is 
granted before the 
rate is applied 
10% free equity 
interest 
Exemption 
during 
exploration 
phase 
Rate reduced by 
10 percentage 
points during 
production phase 
0.5% 
Exemption 
during 
exploration 
phase 
Exemption 
for 7 years 
during 
production 
phase 
12.5% 
Exemption during 
exploration phase 
Rate halved during 
production phase 
(6.25%) 
Cameroon 
 
 
 
 
 
Law no. 2010/011 of 29 July 2010 
Law no. 001-2001 of 16 April 2001 
Decree no. 2002/648/PM of 26 
March 2002 
8% - Precious 
stones: (diamonds, 
emeralds, rubies, 
sapphires) 
3% - Precious 
metals: (gold, 
platinum, etc.) 
2.5% - Base metals 
and other mineral 
substances 
2% - Geothermal 
deposits, source 
water, mineral and 
thermal mineral 
water 
10% free equity 
interest + right 
to acquire an 
additional stake 
in cash up to a 
total limit that 
cannot exceed 
20% 
35% (+3.5% by 
way of Additional 
Municipal Taxes, 
making an 
effective rate of 
38.5%) 
Exemption 
during 
exploration 
phase 
 15% + 1.5% by 
way of Additional 
Municipal Taxes, 
making an 
effective rate of 
16.25% 
Exemption during 
exploration phase 
DR Congo 
 
 
 
 
Law no. 007/2002 of 11 July 2002 
Decree no. 038/2003 of 26 March 
2003 
Inter-ministerial order no. 
3154/CAB.MIN/MINES/01/2007 
and no. 
031/CAB.MIN/FINANCES/2007 of 
09 August 2007 
0% - widely-used 
building materials 
0.5% - iron and 
ferrous metals 
1% - industrial 
minerals 
1% - solid 
hydrocarbons and 
other substances 
not specified 
2% - non-ferrous 
metals 
2.5% - precious 
metals 
4% - precious stones  
No 35%  20% 
Côte 
d'Ivoire 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Law no. 95-553 of 17 July 1995 
Ordinance no. 96-600 of 9 August 
1996 
Decree no. 96-634 of 09 August 
3% - for gold, 
diamonds, precious 
stones and metals 
2.5% - for base 
metals 
10% free equity 
interest 
25% (or 20% for 
companies 
whose turnover 
is less than 1 
billion CFA francs 
and individual 
entrepreneurs  
 12% - General-law 
rate 
18% - Profit 
distributions 
which are exempt 
from profit tax or 
have not been 
taxed at the 
general-law rate 
10% - Dividends of 
companies listed 
on the stock 
exchange 
2% - Income from 
bonds that are 
redeemable 
within at least 5 
years 
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Appendix 3: Empirical studies on the sharing of rent 
Authors Minerals Methods Economic data Tax system simulation Sensitivity analysis Indicators
Simulation: Comparison of national tax systems
Alberta:  Taxes and royalty Net present value before tax 
Papua New Guinea:  Resource rent tax Net present value after tax 
Sao Tome:  Joint Development Zone Tax distortion index
Tanzania: Production sharing and resource rent tax
Trinidad:  Production sharing only
Simulation: Comparison of national tax systems
Canada, USA, Australia, Brazil, Chile, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, Peru, South Africa, Zambia
Initial situation: Royalty with deduction of 65% of capital costs, Mozambique . Time profile of revenue
Project pre-tax NPV
Contractor NPV 
Payback period
Government revenue
AETR, Breakeven Price and METR
Government Share of total benefits
Coefficient ov variation of government revenue
Post Tax IRR, coefficient of variation of IRR
Net present value before tax 
Net present value after tax
Average effective tax rate
Marginal effective tax rate 
Initial situation: Norway : Royalty, income tax, corporate tax, special oil tax, witholding on 
dividends, capital tax on book value of assets.
Simulation: Zero royalty, production allowance, 'uplift' allowance abandoned for specific costs, 
depreciation allowed from the date of investment, reduction in rate of tax on petroleum.
Internal rate of return of the project
Investor's share of rent
Average effective tax rate (AETR)
Government revenue
Internal rate of return of the project
Average effective tax rate
Coefficient of variation of government revenue
Coefficient of variation of private-sector revenue
Initial situation: Mongolia:  entire tax system. 
Simulation: addition of a super-profit tax
Initial situation: Mali:  Royalty, income tax, taxes on dividends. 
Simulation: Reduction in the royalty rate from 6% to 3%.
Black and Roberts (2006) Oil MAP
Hypothetical 
project
Monte Carlo simulation
No
Lund (1992) Oil MAP
 Hypothetical 
project
Monte Carlo simulation
Devereux and Griffith (2003) Industry DCF
Hypothetical 
project
Simulation: Harmonisation of nominal tax rates within the European Union: UK, Germany, France
Podda Abouna (2014) Gold MAP
Existing project 
Canada
Monte Carlo simulation
Net present value
Otto et al.  (2006)
Gold,  
Copper, 
Bauxite
DCF
Three hypothetical 
projects with 
different price and 
cost structures
Ad hoc change: operating 
costs, capital costs, sale 
price
Initial situation: national tax system, Chile, South Africa
Simulation: Eight different bases for mining royalties.
Initial situation: Profit-based royalty, Canada  
Thomas (2010) Gold
Optimal 
control
Hypothetical 
project
No Net present value
Samis et al.  (2007) Gold
MAP 
and DCF
Existing project 
British Columbia
Monte Carlo simulation Net present value
Simulation: Ad valorem  royalty and super-profit taxes
Three hypothetical 
projects with 
different price and 
cost structures
DCFOilDaniel et al.  (2008)
Effective tax rate
Ad hoc change: sale price 
and discount rate
Simulation: (i) deduction increased to 90% plus production sharing, (ii) Simulation of other 
international systems: Nigeria, Angola, Eq. Guinea, Mauritania, Ghana, Madagascar, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Sierra Leone then Norway, UK, Colombia, Australia, East Timor, Peru.
Brewer et al.  (1989) Gold DCF
Hypothetical 
project
Ad hoc change:     
profitability of project, 
inflation, price cycle
Appendix 4: Main industrial gold mining companies present in Africa 
 
Source: Summary of authors according to company declarations available online. Access to economic databases on 
companies present in Africa will make it possible to make this list comprehensive. 
 
Company Headquarters Weblink Country Mining projects
Acacia Mining UK www.acaciamining.com Burkina Faso 1 project
Tanzania 5 projects
Kenya 1 project
Algold Resources Ltd Canada algold.com Burkina Faso 1 project
Mauritania 2 projects
Amara Mining UK www.amaramining.com Côte d'Ivoire 1 project
Sierra Leone 1 project
Burkina Faso 1 project
AngloGold Ashanti South Africa www.anglogoldashanti.com DR Congo 1 project
Ghana 2 projects
Guinea 1 project
Mali 3 projects
Namibia 1 project
Tanzania 1 project
South Africa 5 projects
Asanko Gold Canada www.asanko.com Ghana 1 project
Aureus Mining Inc Canada aureus-mining.com Cameroon 1 project
Liberia 1 project
Avnel Gold Mining Switzerland www.avnelgold.com Mali 1 project
AXMIN Inc Canada axmininc.com Central African Rep. 1 project
Mali 1 project
Senegal 1 project
DRDGold South Africa Drdgold.com South Africa 1 project
Endeavour Canada www.endeavourmining.com Burkina Faso 2 projects
Ghana 1 project
Côte d'Ivoire 1 project
Mali 2 projects
Gold Fields Ltd UK www.goldfields.co.za South Africa 1 project
Ghana 2 projects
Mali 1 project
Golden Star R. Ltd Canada www.gsr.com Ghana 3 projects
Harmony Gold Mining South Africa www.harmony.co.za South Africa 13 projects
Goldston Australia www.goldstonresources.com Gabon 2 projects
Ghana 2 projects
Senegal 1 project
Iamgold Canada www.iamgold Mali 3 projects
Senegal 1 project
Burkina Faso 1 project
Kinross Gold Corp Canada www.kinross.com Ghana 1 project
Mauritania 1 project
La Mancha Canada www.lamancha.ca Côte d'Ivoire 1 project
Sudan 1 project
Legend Gold Corp Canada www.legendgold.com Mali 6 projects
DR Congo 1 project
Lion Gold Corp Australia www.liongoldcorp.com Ghana 1 project
Metallon Gold UK Metcorp.co.uk Zimbabwe 7 projects
Mwana Africa PLC UK www.mwanaafrica.com DR Congo 2 projects
Nevsun Resource Ltd Canada www.nevsun.com Eritrea 1 project
Newcrest Mining Ltd Australia www.newcrest.com.au Côte d'Ivoire 1 project
Newmont Mining Corp USA www.newmont.com Ghana 2 projects
Nordgold UK www.nordgold.com Guinea 2 projects
Burkina Faso 2 projects
Nyota Minerals Ltd Ethiopia www.nyotaminerals.com Ethiopia 1 project
Pan African Resources UK www.panafricanresources.com South Africa 2 projects
Perseus Mining Ltd Australia perseusmining.com Côte d'Ivoire 3 projects
Randgold Resources Ltd Jersey randgoldresources.com DR Congo 1 project
Côte d'Ivoire 1 project
Mali 2 projects
Senegal 1 project
Resolute Mining Australia www.resolute-ltd.com.au Mali 1 project
Tanzania 1 project
Sonatrach Algeria www.sonatrach.com Algeria 1 project
SEMAFO Inc Canada www.semafo.com Burkina Faso 1 project
Sibanye Gold South Africa www.sibanyegold.co.za South Africa 4 projects
Stratex International plc UK www.stratexinternational.com Senegal 2 projects
Liberia 1 project
Sunridge Gold Corp Canada www.sunridgegold.com Eritrea 1 project
Teranga Gold Corp Canada www.terangagold.com Senegal 1 project
